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Offensiveness Analyzed:  






This essay combines an observation of comparative law with a discussion of the issue of 
offensive speech.  The clarifying example I will use is the comparison between the American and 
the Israeli doctrines of free speech. 
One intricate question in the theory of free speech and its comparative study is whether 
offensiveness of speech may, by itself, be a sufficient basis for its being silenced.  To use what 
became the paradigm of this dilemma, the “Skokie affair”: how should a society respond to a 
request by neo-Nazis to parade wearing uniforms and swastikas in a town predominantly 
inhabited by Jews, when we foresee no violent incidents taking place?1 
The Israeli and American doctrines of free speech diverge on this issue: offensiveness per 
se (albeit extreme offensiveness) may in Israel be a sufficient justification for prohibiting speech; 
in the United States it is not.  This seems to be a significant difference.  However, one of the 
central goals of this essay is to modify the interpretation we typically attach to such doctrinal 
differences.  We tend to assume that important differences in legal solutions reflect different 
moral priorities, and, in that case, if one of the solutions is right the other must be wrong.  This 
dichotomous way of thinking may result in a unitary, occasionally simplistic, perspective on 
appropriate legal solutions. 
More concretely, this essay proceeds on two levels.  On one level I present some claims 
regarding the components I find crucial for an effective comparative legal analysis.  Since these 
claims are far from being common knowledge, I try both to validate them and to demonstrate 
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their analytical potential by proceeding to a more concrete level.  On this second converging 
level, I compare aspects of free speech jurisprudence in Israel and the United States, with an 
emphasis on offensive speech.  The essay outlines the sociopolitical parameters that influence 
free speech in each country and the corresponding legal doctrines that have evolved.  This 
comparison provides the background for a central question: is the doctrinal difference concerning 
offensive speech the result of differences in the two societies’ moral priorities?  I argue that the 
apparent difference attests less to a difference in moral priorities and more to the existence of 
certain, partly unique, stabilizing mechanisms of American free-speech jurisprudence and racial 
relations policy.  I claim that these mechanisms structurally moderate harm to feelings in most 
types of offensive speech and thereby rationalize a legal rule in the United States, which does not 
accept harm to feelings as a sufficient basis for prohibiting speech. 
 
Basic Claims Regarding a Comparative Study of Law 
The essay is based upon two overall claims, neither is novel.  First, a good analysis of 
comparative law demands a comprehensive perspective of law and society, i.e., a solid 
understanding of the interdependency between the legal system and the sociopolitical dimensions 
of the compared societies. 
The second overall claim deals with the basic stages of comparative legal analysis.  
According to it there is an initial descriptive stage in which we try to identify, with regard to a 
certain subject matter, the central legal differences between the countries we are comparing.  
Then, still in this descriptive stage, we proceed by inquiring whether these differences are truly 
meaningful, either from a sociopolitical or a moral perspective.  From a sociopolitical perspective 
we ask: do they differ in their function—in their social, political or economic ramifications, or in 
their efficacy in achieving certain goals?  From the moral standpoint we inquire: how much do 
these legal differences actually testify to differences in the countries’ value systems and basic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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principles?  Only when the differences reflect different moral priorities may we move to the 
normative stage, and ask which of the approaches is more desirable. 
The first claim, the interplay between society and law, may be demonstrated in many 
ways.  I will confine myself to a few examples drawn from the domain of freedom of speech.   
Free speech doctrines deal with the “marketplace of ideas.” Many of us conceive of the 
doctrine as the outline for justified or permitted state-restrictions upon speech, that is, as the 
precondition for a legitimate silencing of speech.  But this understanding is too narrow a view of 
the issues involved.  There are at least two other ways of influencing the marketplace of ideas 
besides simply the silencing of expression that the state considers to be harmful.  One way this 
can be done is non-intervention—the choice not to act against powerful private actors in the civil 
society.  The government may opt for passivity because these actors are pushing society in the 
direction the government prefers anyway, or because these actors are good enough at silencing 
‘problematic’ views, thus letting the state sit idle and not ‘dirty its hands.’  Consider, for example, 
the issue of Spanish in the United States.  The federal government does not have to impose an 
official “English-only” policy.  The schools are overwhelmingly run in English, thus eliminating 
the language issue for the second generation; cultural and economic pressures do much of the rest 
of the job.  Another important type of state intervention is also somewhat veiled.  This is 
affirmative support of certain favorable views rather than the silencing of counter-views.  
Examples of such affirmative support include enlarging the function of the state as a speaker, 
making use of state-owned media, adopting decisions in the field of elementary and secondary 
education, and providing selective financial support or tax exemptions.   
In addition, social arrangements, including legal ones, are contingent by nature. They are 
dependent upon historical and social circumstances, cultural norms and the like.  Thus, for 
example, the existence of a well-developed censorship apparatus in one society and the lack of 
one in another, does not necessarily attest to deep differences in the two societies’ values and 
priorities.  Each society reflects its special circumstances, so that the censorship mechanism in the 
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first society may be a product, partly or wholly, of a state of emergency.  (We should be careful 
however not to accept what is merely a pretext).  Another important contextual/circumstantial 
difference might be the existence of a non-legal social mechanism that replaces the legal 
arrangements that appear in the other society. 
Considering these factors, it is possible to see that the pivotal axis for comparative law 
should be the function of legal arrangements, the key question being: Is a difference in the legal 
arrangements functional, or is it only a difference in appearance?  If the difference is indeed 
functional, then we proceed to the additional question: Does the difference spring from different 
circumstances or from different values and basic principles? 
Comparative analysis of aspects of the doctrines of free speech in Israel and the United 
States, therefore, requires an investigation of the major sociopolitical differences and similarities 
between the two countries. 
 
Israel and the United States - The Principal Socio -Political Parameters  
Israel combines a particularistic interest, namely its ‘self’-identification as the state of the 
Jewish people, with a universalistic commitment defined by its allegiance to a liberal democratic 
tradition.  Internally, Israel is a deeply-divided society. 2  There is both an ethno-national cleavage 
of Arabs and Jews within Israel, and a major religious cleavage expressed by the division 
between religious and secular Jews.3  In addition, Israel must contend with significant geo-
                                                                 
2 By “deeply -divided societies” I mean societies that contain extensive communal divisions along lines of an ascriptive 
nature, such as national identity, racial attributes, ethnic origin, or religion.  These societies are naturally more prone to 
inner tensions and current or potential instability.  AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A 
COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 3-4 (1977), and DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 31-32 (1985). 
3 The current population of Israel as of 1998 was estimated at 5.94 million, of which, approximately 80% were jews 
and 20% were non-jews (mostly members of the Arab minority). See ISRAEL M INISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAEL AT 
50: A STATISTICAL GLIMPSE, available at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00MX0 (last visited Dec. 18, 
2001).  There are more cleavages within the Israeli society, but I will mention only a third important one – the division 
between Ashkenazi Jews (Jews of European descent) and Mizrahi or Sephardi Jews (Jews mainly from Mediterranean 
or North African countries). 
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political tensions.  It must deal with the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
(especially those who live in the occupied territories—the West Bank and Gaza Strip—since 
1967); and the conflicts between several Arab states and one Muslim non-Arab state (Iran).  One 
has to remember that these tensions are augmented by one of the above-mentioned cleavages: the 
one vis-a-vis the Palestinian-Arab minority (the Palestinian citizens of Israel).  This national 
minority is perceived as trapped in an irredentist situation—i.e., trapped in a conflict between its 
people and the country of its citizenship.4 
How does Israel compare sociopolitically to the United States?  The first point follows 
what has just been outlined: Israel must deal with greater geo-political pressures and a deeper 
sense of fragility.  Since its inception, Israel has basically been under a state of emergency.  One 
should be careful, however, not to overstate this point as the intensity of security problems 
fluctuates.  Yet, one should remember that regardless of these fluctuations, there are genuine 
enduring tensions, which call for certain precautions (in the domain of expression, military 
censorship may be one example). 
Another point is that both countries share at least two very important characteristics: both 
based on a democratic ethos and are deeply-divided or ‘plural’ societies.  In the States the major 
cleavage is race; in Israel it is national identity.  These commonalties are very significant indeed, 
but, at the same time, we must note that we encounter here two very different kinds of 
‘pluralism.’  These two societies are using substantially different models for managing the basic 
cleavage that divides them. 
The United States uses a liberal integrative model.  The concept of America as a ‘melting 
pot’ is one variety of this model.  In the liberal integrative model basic group identities are 
exposed to cultural and economic pressures that erode them.  These identities are supposed to be 
                                                                 
4 During clashes which took place within Israel in October 2000 (simultaneously with the Palestinian second Intifada), 
twelve Arab citizens were killed by the Israeli police. 
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replaced by an overarching loyalty, a common belongingness to the American society.5  Even if 
American public policy were to become more multi-cultural in orientation, this would not 
represent a radical change of course.  American culture will not become more tolerant to parallel 
cultures, only to subcultures.  Subcultures are limited to not much more than the preservation of a 
few folkloric features of the ancestral culture.  The two fundamental elements of the liberal-
integrative attitude are, then, the strategic choice of integration of subgroups into one nation, and 
the formal neutrality of the state in terms of race, religion, and national origin.  If instead of 
neutrality the state had a non-neutral character this would prevent the creation of the overarching 
common citizenship. 
Israel manages its pluralism differently; it employs an ‘ethnic democracy’ model to 
negotiate the Arab / Jewish inter-communal relationship. 6  First, the state is not neutral 
concerning the national cleavage, but rather, it takes a side, identifying itself with one of its 
communities.  It openly adopts many of the symbols, values and priorities of the majority group.  
Second, the strategic choice is to keep the two communities separate.  However, unlike the 
American South until the 1960s, the separation here is mutually preferred by overwhelming 
majorities within both communities.7 
                                                                 
5 KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION, ch. 1 (1989).  There are a 
few exceptions to this general pattern of inter-communal relationship.  There is the kind of “autonomy” model provided 
to Native Americans, Puerto Ricans on the island, and arguably some religious sects, such as the Amish, Mennonites, 
and Hasidic Jews.  See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 12, 38-42 (1995). 
6 For a thorough treatment of this model, see Sami Smooha, Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the 
Arab Minority in Israel, 13 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDIES 389 (1990). 
7 Other examples of ethnic democracies might be Northern Ireland as reflected in the relationship between the 
Protestant majority and the Catholic minority, at least until 1972, and Malaysia at least since the end of the 1960s vis-a-
vis its Chinese and Indian minorities.  See Paul Bew, The Belfast Agreement of 1998: From Ethnic Democracy to a 
Multicultural, Consociational Settlement?, (Paper presented in the conference on “Multiculturalism and Democracy in 
Divided Societies”, University of Haifa, March 17-18, 1999), and Diane Mauzy, Malaysia: Malay Political Hegemony 
and `Coercive Consociationalism’, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNICS CONFLICT REGULATION 106 (J. McGarry and B. 
O'Leary eds., 1993). 
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Besides the ethno-national schism and its resultant societal tensions, Israel must also find 
a mode for accommodating the intracommunal relationship between religious and secular Jews.  
To handle this internal relationship Israel uses a third model, which may be called 
consocionationalism.  The paradigmatic examples of this model are Switzerland, Belgium, and 
Canada, all vis-a-vis their lingual, Francophone, minority.  Under consocionationalism 
communities choose, or except, separation over integration, while at the same time the state 
maintains neutrality, i.e., non-affiliation with either community.  This separation is not 
necessarily represented by physical isolation, but rather through an active watchfulness and 
guarding of the communities’ unique identities and characteristics.  However, 
consocionationalism does not function as an ideal system of harmony, peace and fraternity.  It 
functions as a partnership with intensive and sometimes fierce bargaining at its core.8 
History also plays a role influencing political and moral positions, including those 
concerning freedom of speech.  More specifically, history has significantly affected positions 
regarding tolerance towards non-democratic views.  The United States carries with it the 
traumatic memory, the ghost, of the McCarthy Era’s overly zealous silencing of radical leftist 
positions.  For the Israeli Jews there is a polar recollection of a society that was recklessly 
unassertive towards totalitarian movements: the traumatic memory of the fall of the Weimar 
Republic and of the rise of the Nazis, who came to power while taking advantage of democratic 
processes.9 
After this brief acquaintance with the influencing factors that act upon the two societies’ 
legal systems, we are better equipped to handle the comparative analysis of their doctrines of 
freedom of speech. 
                                                                 
8 See LIJPHART, supra note 2, at 158-161, and Ian Lustick, Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism vs 
Control, 31 WORLD POL. 325 (1979). 
9 For examples of how this historical trauma played a role in Israeli jurisprudence, see Yardor v. Central Elections 
Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19(iii) P.D. 365, (1965); Jiryis v. District Commissioner, 18(iv) P.D. 673 (1964); The 
Electric Company v. Ha’aretz, 32(iii) P.D. 337, (1977). 
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The American Doctrine of Freedom of Speech 
There is something very impressive and thought provoking about the American doctrine 
of freedom of expression.  It is probably the most libertarian free speech doctrine in modern 
times.  It is remarkable that such libertarianism appears within a society that is much less 
homogeneous and tranquil than, say, the Scandinavian countries.  This has made the American 
doctrine a role model, a kind of a normative standard. 
This role has also made the doctrine an object of criticism.  The deep libertarian nature of 
the doctrine, which is mainly a product of the firm endorsement of the principle of “content 
neutrality,” is highly controversial.  Content neutrality is the rigorous objection to regulation of 
speech based on the content or the communicative impact of the message conveyed.  This 
principle, which will be further discussed in a short while, draws attack from within and without.  
Feminists object to what they see as a blind adherence to the doctrine even in the field of 
pornography.  Former President Bush wanted to amend the Constitution to protect the honor of 
the flag, by prohibiting symbolic actions in the form of flag desecration.  Some scholars, minority 
leaders, and organizations advocate the restriction of hate speech.10  Simultaneously parts of the 
international community criticized the U.S. for being late to join (and for entering a reservation 
when it joined) the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.  America has entered a reservation to this important convention primarily 
because of Article 4, which requires that countries penalize the dissemination of racist ideas and 
incitement to racial discrimination.  This policy runs contrary to the American doctrinal principle 
of strict content neutrality in the field of restrictions on speech. 
The uniqueness of the American doctrine as a comparative model is somewhat 
compromised by the fact that at various times in recent American history, for example, during the 
period of the Cold War and the McCarthy era, there was substantial erosion of freedom of speech 
                                                                 
10 For one prominent criticism, see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s 
Story, 87 M ICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
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and association of unpopular political groups, especially on the left.  In addition, there continues 
to be a significant gap between the doctrine of free speech and the actual scope of the 
marketplace of ideas in the United States.11  This criticism, with all its validity, does not 
undermine the importance of the American doctrine, but rather sheds a more realistic light on the 
condition of freedom of speech in America.  The doctrine remains impressive in its libertarian 
nature, affording constitutional protection from state intervention even to political minorities who 
choose to engage in expression that severely offends the majority.  The American doctrine is also 
thought provoking because of its insistence that the offensiveness of the speech can never be, by 
itself, a sufficient basis for silencing speech. 
The primary example of the doctrine’s libertarianism is indeed the consistent adherence 
to the principle of content neutrality in the last decades.  Consider a few examples. In Texas v. 
Johnson,12 the defendant burned an American flag during a political rally.  Using a standard of 
“strict scrutiny,” the Supreme Court found that Texas was actually prosecuting Johnson because it 
found his message offensive.  Therefore, the criminal charge against him was held to be 
unconstitutional.  Even though the Court deemed preserving the honor of the flag a compelling 
interest, it stated that the state could have found other means besides silencing its citizens to 
protect this interest.  In Cohen v. California,13 the Supreme Court held that profane, offensive 
language is nonetheless speech in the eyes of the First Amendment.  In that case, Cohen was 
charged with offensive behavior for wearing a jacket bearing the inscription ‘fuck the draft.’  The 
Court affirmed, however, that the Constitution does protect offensive speech.  It does not condone 
                                                                 
11 One does not have to adopt the following criticisms in their entirety in order to appreciate the validity of the point 
they are making.  A major argument, and to my mind a valid one, is that in the United States there are indeed not many 
official restrictions upon speech, but that there are very powerful censorship mechanisms within the American “civil 
society,” mechanisms that are ideological, economic or both.  See, e.g., the criticism of critical legal studies scholar, 
DAVID KAIRYS, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (1982) 140; see also, NOAM CHOMSKY, AMERICAN POWER 
AND THE NEW M ANDARINS (1969). 
12 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
13 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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a filtering of language that allows for some speech as palatable, while silencing other speech as 
perverse.  In American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut,14 the court responded to a feminist attack on 
pornography.  The court rejected the attack as an attempt at ‘thought control,’ holding it 
unconstitutional to dictate some expression as acceptable because it presented an endorsed 
viewpoint, and other expression as illegal because it expressed a repugnant viewpoint.  Finally, in 
Doe v. University of Michigan,15 the court held that public universities usually cannot prohibit 
student use of offensive racist speech. 
In general one can say that in the last decades whenever the government has tried to 
silence speech, based on the content or the communicative impact of the message conveyed, the 
Supreme Court has insisted that the restrictive conditions of Brandenburg v. Ohio16 be met. The 
balancing test in Brandenburg is very demanding: it requires a narrowly tailored restriction that 
serves a compelling governmental interest.  The case indicates what will be accepted as 
compelling: "[A] state [should not] forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."17  One should note that further jurisprudence 
(including the Supreme Court cases mentioned above) has clarified that the components of the 
Brandenburg test require a high probability and imminence of the danger of use of force, not 
merely the danger of harm to feelings.  In other words, emotional harm by itself cannot serve as a 
basis for silencing speech.  Thus America does subscribe to the general concept of ensuring 
against harm, but limits the definition of harm in most cases to an imminent outburst of 
violence.18  Although the breadth of speech that is protected is immense, the protection is not 
                                                                 
14 American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
15 Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.Mich. 1989). 
16 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969). 
17 Id. at 447. 
18 There are only few exceptions to this requirement of imminent violence.  These are mainly, “captive audience” 
situations (which I will discuss promptly), defamation, and obscenity.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988), 849-856, 904-928. 
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absolute.  The United States might be the most extreme in terms of the type and magnitude of 
harm it demands as a justification for state-restrictions upon speech, but all the same, a boundary, 
namely imminent violence, does exist, along with a few exceptions. 
One should not be misled, however, into mistaking content neutrality for moral 
indifference.  There are core moral values at the basis of any liberal democracy.  The doctrine 
simply holds that more than the falseness of the idea is required in order to restrict it.19  Thus the 
state can affirmatively support its core values and at the same time be extremely prudent in 
silencing views it considers evil.  
To illustrate the difference between content neutrality and moral indifference, observe the 
First Amendment itself.  Its first part deals with religion, the second part with expression.  The 
main difference between the two parts lies in the “establishment clause,” 20 which provides that 
the government is more restricted when it comes to religion.  The Constitution prohibits the 
government not only from restricting religion, but also from endorsing a favored one.  In other 
words, as opposed to the sphere of expression, where the government can affirmatively support 
favored stances, when it comes to religion the government is compelled to practice not only 
content neutrality in restrictions, but also official moral indifference in terms of rival creeds. 
There are very few instances when speech can be regulated on the basis of its content 
even though the conditions set out by the Brandenburg case have not been met.  If we check these 
cases carefully, we will see that they contain more harm, an additional kind of harm, beyond that 
of emotional distress.  Thus, we must be careful not to confuse them with situations (such as 
sometimes occur in Israel) where emotional harm is deemed sufficient justification for the 
regulation of speech.  The two main exceptions to the Brandenburg standard are ‘fighting words’ 
and ‘captive audience.’  The ‘fighting words’ exception shares the same basis as the Brandenburg 
                                                                 
19 See, more generally, the lucid discussion in Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 238-
239 (1993). 
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rationale, namely the fear of an imminent, violent incident as the outcome of speech; albeit in this 
situation the feared incident is not violent action by the supporters of the advocated views, but 
rather the action of the person who has been provoked by the harsh insult directed against him or 
her.21  This exception applies only to words that would likely provoke the average person to 
retaliate in an immediate fight. 
The second principal exception to the Brandenburg conditions is the ‘captive audience.’  
With careful observation we find that here too the harm caused is not purely emotional injury.  
Instead, it is a matter of an additional harm, namely, an essentially intolerable invasion of 
substantial privacy-interests.  The Supreme Court, though, implements this exception sparingly 
and is reluctant to classify situations where the ‘captive audience’ exception would apply too 
broadly.  We become a ‘captive audience’ when speech is directed towards us and we cannot 
reasonably avoid exposure to it.  Thus, on the one hand, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,22 
the Supreme Court held that noise limits could be placed on anti-abortion protesters so that 
women receiving treatment inside the clinic would not be subjected to an onslaught of unwanted 
messages during their examinations and medical procedures.  But on the other hand, in Cohen v. 
California , the people inside a Californian courthouse were not considered a ‘captive audience’ 
because they could have looked the other way and thereby avoided further contact with the 
unwanted expression.23  The important point is that the ‘captive audience’ exception can be seen 
as a situation in which emotional harm is augmented by a severe privacy infringement.  In 
addition, the captive audience justification for restricting speech is a non-content based 
restriction.  It applies to any speech, regardless of viewpoint. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
20 “Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or restricting the free exercise thereof”, U.S. 
CONST. Amend. I. 
21 Fighting words doctrine originated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
22 Madsen v. Womens’ Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 2516 (1994). 
23 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-2 (1971). 
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Ultimately, although both these exceptions—‘fighting words’ and ‘captive audience’—
incorporate an element of emotional harm, the necessary factor from a regulatory perspective is 
either violence or privacy interests.  Now let us turn to the defining characteristics of the Israeli 
doctrine. 
 
The Israeli Doctrine of Freedom of Speech 
Because of Israel’s essence as an ethnic democracy, because of its security concerns, and 
because of recent Jewish history (especially the Holocaust), the doctrine of free speech in Israel 
has been under pressure for a long time. 
Being an ethnic democracy means that the state is partial; it has a favored community and 
it operates a biased policy towards non-favored groups, including discriminatory practices 
especially in the allocation of public goods.  These hie rarchical features of an ethnic democracy 
carry with them the potential for an open conflict.  They usually cause resentment in members of 
the minority.  These reactions, in turn, often make the majority feel threatened, and for perceived 
needs of stability and security, it often subjects the minority to ‘control’ measures.  These control 
measures are a mixture of manipulation and restrictions, and they obviously spread to the fields of 
freedom of speech, demonstration, association, participation in elections, access to mass media, 
hiring of teachers and other state employees, and the like.24 
I would like to expand a bit more on the dialectic and ambivalent nature of ethnic 
democracy, because these features are crucial to the understanding of certain developments that 
have occurred in the last two decades in the domain of free speech in Israel.  Ambivalence and 
                                                                 
24 Notice the vicious circle that exists here: hierarchy feeds resentment, resentment by the minority feeds fear in the 
majority, this fear sustains the control measures, which in turn perpetuate resentment, and so on.  For comprehensive 
analyses of the control measures directed at the Arab minority in Israel, especially until the 1970s.  See IAN LUSTICK, 
ARABS IN THE JEWISH STATE : ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL M INORITY (1980); SABRI JIRYIS, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 
(1976); Sami Smooha, Control of Minorities in Israel and Northern Ireland, 22 COMP. STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 256 
(1980). 
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dialectics are a reasonable outcome of simultaneous pressures, i.e., serving the particularistic 
goals of the majority community, while being under the command of certain universal 
commitments and a demanding need to guard political stability.  Overt and emphasized 
ethnocentric goals and/or too many restrictions upon liberties will easily lead society to a ‘crisis 
of legitimacy.’  This is why a sophisticated ethnic democracy often prefers more oblique and 
subtle measures vis-a-vis its minority, and why it tries to accompany restrictions upon the 
minority with similar ones inflicted upon extreme elements within the majority group. 
A major example of the influencing character of an ethnic democracy in Israel is section 
7A of the Basic Law: the Knesset, which regulates the rights of parties to participate in 
parliamentary elections.  This section encapsulates the above mentioned pressures that affect 
ethnic democracies. It provides: 
A candidates’ list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if 
among its goals or deeds, either expressly or impliedly, are one of the following: 
(1) The negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the State of the 
Jewish People;25 
(2) The negation of the democratic nature of the State;  
(3) The incitement to racism. 
Section 7A expresses the restrictive facet of ethnic democracy (as well as its innate ambivalence).  
However, as explained above, the expressions and needs of an ethnic democracy are dialectical.  
This is reflected in Israel by two major features of its ‘marketplace of ideas’: the state’s active 
role as ‘a speaker’ and the liberalization of freedom of speech in Israel.  In its active role as ‘a 
speaker,’ the state speaks forcefully through the contents of its ‘symbolic order.’  In other words, 
the Jewish community’s values, narratives, and views receive favorable treatment in the 
                                                                 
25 Section 7A(1) was the focus of discussion in a major court case.  See Ben Shalom v. Central Election Committee for 
the Twelfth Knesset, 43(iv) P.D. 221 (1989). See also Erlich v. The Central Election Committee, 53(iii) P.D. 38 (1999).  
Cf. Eisikson v. The Parties Register, 50(ii) P.D. 529 (1996). 
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educational system, in the national symbols and in the allocation of access to the nationalized 
mass communications.  This symbolic order calls for fewer problems of legitimacy (when 
compared to restrictions), and is colored in Israel by the ambivalent synthesis of nationalism and 
democracy, both of which are subsumed within the dominant ideology of Israeli society, Zionism. 
The last two decades also show a liberalization of freedom of speech in Israel.  The scope 
of free speech has expanded following certain changes in the doctrine of freedom of speech, in 
the social circumstances, and in the structure and diversity of the mass media.  While the reasons 
for these phenomena are complex, it can be fairly said that they are consistent with a 
sophisticated ethnic democracy, one that understands that by upholding certain liberties, stability 
is served. 
The Israeli Supreme Court has been an important player in bringing doctrinal changes in 
the domain of free speech.  It has pushed the Israeli doctrine considerably in the direction of the 
American doctrine.  However, there are still important differences between the two.  Outlining all 
the differences is beyond the scope of this paper; I will elaborate upon the one difference that is 
my focus here: the issue of whether harm to feelings (offensiveness) is a sufficient reason for 
restricting speech.26 
 
Thinking about Emotional Harm 
As outlined concisely above, the two countries diverge on the issue of offensive speech 
causing only emotional harm; i.e., they are faced with the same basic dilemma but differ in the 
choices they make.  On the one hand, emotional harm can hurt and damage as much as physical 
                                                                 
26 For a comprehensive analysis of the American influence on the Israeli doctrine of free speech until the end of the 
1970s, see Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel’s jurisprudence of Free Speech, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21 
(1981-1982).  For more recent accounts, see  David Kretzmer, The Influence of the First Amendment Jurisprudence on 
Judicial Decision Making in Israel, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (S. Slonim ed., 1990); and GARY J. JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE 
UNITED STATES, ch. 6 (1993). 
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harm; on the other hand, emotional harm is an intangible and subjective harm, and as such, it is 
more prone to abuse, including selective use by the government. 
Recall that in the United States the offensiveness of ideas conveyed is not a valid basis 
for their suppression; by comparison, in Israel severe emotional harm may be a sufficient basis 
for restricting speech.  This doctrinal choice is one of the main reasons that the United 
States is very tolerant of hate speech, while Israel and most of the rest of the world regulate 
against it.  It is true that many of the American states have enacted anti-hate speech laws, but they 
have been interpreted to be restricted to the ‘fighting words’ exception, and moreover, their 
constitutionality is questionable.27 
This difference is an important doctrinal dissimilarity.  It is not simply a matter of 
applying a similar balancing test to two different societies and getting different answers due to 
different circumstances.  Rather, we are dealing with a society (America) in which the basic legal 
doctrine dictates that no matter how certain the occurrence of emotional harm and no matter how 
serious it is, restrictions on the offending speech will not be justified. 
This unique aspect of the American doctrine—this basic willingness to never make 
emotional harm a sufficient basis for silencing speech—has intrigued me.  I was very puzzled by 
the question of ‘who is right’—the Americans, with their attitude that emotional harm is never 
sufficient to silence speech or most of the rest of the world?  More specifically, I was troubled 
and confused by the painful illustration of this dilemma in the Skokie affair.28  The decision in the 
Skokie case, as mentioned above in the discussion of Collin, was to permit neo-Nazis to parade 
wearing uniforms, with swastikas, in a town predominantly inhabited by Jews, including many 
survivors of the Holocaust.  Was this decision right or wrong? 
There is something misleading about the way I first put this question to myself. Questions 
in the structure of ‘who is right’ tend to direct us to a dichotomous answer: side A is right and 
                                                                 
27 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2543-4 (1992). 
28 For the Skokie case, see Collin v. Smith, supra note 1. 
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side B is wrong.  But reality often evades dichotomies.  For example, there may be other options, 
better than either of the two we have chosen to examine.  In that case we might be able to 
conclude that A and B are both partly right and partly wrong as compared with option C.  
Another possible direction is to say that option A is quite right in society X, but option B is 
preferable in society Y.  This context-related or society-related direction is the one that is most 
applicable here. 
My contention is that American Law and American reality contain mechanisms that 
structurally moderate harm to feelings, thereby enabling the existence of a legal rule that does not 
recognize harm to feelings as a sufficient basis for silencing speech.  Hereinafter I unfold this 
argument. 
 
Looking at Hate Speech 
When we focus on the issue of the emotional harm of hate speech, we notice that there 
are various levels of emotional harm, differing in magnitude and type.29  Consider the following: 
Imagine being a minority group member encountering racist speech directed against you or 
against a member of your group.  You would probably feel emotions of rage, fear, and sometimes 
humiliation.  However, an extremely important dimension of your emotional harm depends on the 
social reaction to the racist position expressed.30  This is the lesson of Brown v. Board of 
Education.31  When there is an endorsement, even if it is only implied, of racist positions by the 
wider society, the magnitude of the harm reaches a completely different level.  Moreover, the 
                                                                 
29 One has to keep in mind, though, that hate speech often embraces various potential harms, which go beyond 
emotional harm alone.  The literature here is vast.  For a comprehensive analysis of the harms associated with hate 
speech, especially racist speech, see, e.g., David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. RE V. 445 
(1987); Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment, 65 S. CAL. L. RE V. 1887 (1992); and Matsuda, 
supra note 10. 
30 For an extended discussion of this general point, see Lee Bollinger, Notes Toward an Idea: Freedom of Speech and 
Minorities in the United States, 20 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 181 (1991); Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal 
Identification, 11 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 303 (1991); and Matsuda, supra note 10. 
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type of harm changes.  Black children in segregated schools were affected by public 
stigmatization.  Their self-perception was affected: they acquired feelings of inferiority, which 
probably caused long-term harm and may have been irreversible.  In addition, when the state 
seems sympathetic to the racist position or even if it is merely perceived as ambiva lent toward 
racism, there is a metamorphosis in the basic situation.  It is no longer a situation in which a vocal 
political minority is posited against an ethnic or racial minority, it now becomes an inter-
communal issue.  A new situation is presented where the immense powers of the state apparatus 
seem to have no concern or less concern for the defense of the vulnerable ethnic minority.  This 
change causes deep feelings of alienation among the minority members and creates a much more 
acute existential fear.  Notice, however, that this metamorphosis in the type and magnitude of 
harm happens only when the minority interprets the situation as revealing a state endorsement, 
implied endorsement, or ambivalence toward the racist claims. 
The interesting question concerns the parameters that effect the interpretation that the 
minority gives to the state’s inaction towards hate-speech.  The answer is complex. In the case of 
hate-speech and minorities, important interpretive factors are: the status of the minority in the 
relevant society and the doctrine and practice of free speech in that society.  To illustrate the 
interplay of these parameters let us return to the Skokie affair.  It is my assessment that the major 
portion of the Jewish minority in America and even a substantial portion of the Black minority 
(both targets of neo-Nazi activities) have not interpreted the permit given to the Nazis as showing 
ambivalence on the part of United States authorities toward racist positions.  There are three main 
reasons why this showing of content neutrality in the domain of speech activity has not been 
interpreted as moral indifference toward racist positions.  First, as mentioned above, at least since 
the mid-1960s the United States has firmly subscribed to the liberal-integrative model of inter-
communal relationship.  Second, there is an official policy against racial discrimination itself (as 
opposed to racist speech), not only in state action, but also in private action.  These policies 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
31 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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include the Fourteenth Amendment, anti-discrimination laws, and (modest) affirmative action 
programs operating since the 1960s and 1970s.  The third parameter that acts against a deeply 
offensive interpretation of the state’s inaction in the domain of speech is the doctrine of free 
speech itself.  The very fact that the content-neutrality principle plays such a dominant role in the 
doctrine, and the fact that since the 1960s it has been implemented in a basically consistent and 
non-selective way, prevents the state from being identified with the unsilenced speech.  In order 
to detect the position of the state we look mainly at the actions that the state chooses to take or not 
to take as the case may be.  Choice reveals preferences.  The American freedom of speech 
doctrine is the most extreme in forcing the government not to silence speech, thereby preventing 
the government from using speech regulation as a means of illustrating its preferences. 
If, by comparison, we look at societies with less content neutral doctrines of free speech 
the story changes.  Consider, for example, Israel and the dilemma posed by Rabbi Meir Kahane 
during the 1980s.  Kahane was an ultra right wing leader of the Kach party who incited racist 
views against the Palestinian-Arab minority.  A closer examination of Israeli law in the domain of 
speech is essential to understanding the state’s action in response to Kahane. 
Israeli law has shown less content neutrality in the domain of speech.  There exist, for 
example, provisions in the penal code against offending of religious feelings.  Also, the Israeli 
Supreme Court has shown willingness to authorize prior-restraint of speech on the basis of severe 
harm to feelings of members of various groups, among them survivors of the death camps and 
families who lost a child in one of the wars.32  The Palestinian-Arab minority, if not given equal 
protection in this regard, could then pose this valid question concerning the Israeli public policy: 
                                                                 
32 Noah Films v. The Film Censorship Board, 30(i) P.D. 757 (1975); Yosha v. The Film Censorship Board, 35(iii) P.D. 
421 (1981). 
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why are their feelings protected and ours not when we are subjected to racist rhetoric?  Is it not an 
indication of Israel’s ambivalence towards the racist positions?33 
These questions are further sharpened by the other important influencing factor I have 
pointed to: the sociopolitical background of the state.  Because Israel is structured as an ethnic 
democracy, there is already a strong, deeply rooted ambivalence regarding the status of the Arabs; 
and the Palestinian-Arab minority holds a deep-seated sense of vulnerability.34  Both factors—the 
lower adherence to content neutrality in the Israeli doctrine of freedom of speech and the ethno-
democratic character of the state—converged to pressure the state when Kahane appeared on the 
Israeli political scene.  Israel had to make an explicit effort to demarcate sharply the differences 
between itself and Kahane; to show unequivocally that Kahane and his ideology are far beyond 
the pale of acceptability.  Consequently, in the mid-1980s legal changes were introduced in the 
Israeli Knesset, by which Kahane and his party were excluded from the elections, and racial 
incitement became a distinct crime in the Israeli penal code.35 
 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I have attempted to make certain observations regarding comparative law, 
which may help us draw more realistic and meaningful lessons from the comparisons we make, 
especially in the domain of free speech.  One observation deals with the criticism the United 
States has faced for its hesitation in adopting certain international instruments aimed at 
eradicating racial discrimination because of the presence of anti-hate speech clauses in these 
instruments.  This criticism springs from the misguided assumption held by many jurists, that 
                                                                 
33 During the Rushdie affair Muslims in England advanced similar arguments.  This was because the English offence of 
blasphemy had been interpreted to apply only to offences against Christian creeds.  See Sebastian Poulter, Towards 
Legislative Reform of the Blasphemy and Racial Hatred Laws, PUB. LAW 371 (1991). 
34 See also Ruth Wedgwood, Freedom of Expression and Racist Speech, 8 TEL AVIV UNIV. STUD. IN LAW 325, 336 
(1988) 
35 For a survey of these developments, see, e.g., David Kretzmer, Racial incitement in Israel, 22 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 
243 (1993). 
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countries that share moral principles must use the same legal means to achieve these principles in 
their respective societies.  Such an assumption is problematic because it does not differentiate 
between a society’s ‘strategic lines’ and the means used to realize those lines.  The means, among 
them the legal arrangements, have greater flexibility and variation than is generally presumed.  
They are also contingent upon the specific circumstances of the particular society and they are 
often interchangeable.  I have tried to illustrate this point by comparing the American and Israeli 
doctrines of freedom of speech. 
We could interpret the absence of anti-hate speech laws in the United States and conclude 
either that this phenomenon is a clear indication that the United States is not greatly concerned 
with protecting vulnerable minorities, or that it reflects the exaggerated libertarian nature of the 
American doctrine of freedom of speech.  Both conclusions would be rather superficial. Instead, 
if we examine things through the prism that was unfolded above, we reach a third, more realistic 
interpretation.  The combination of the content neutrality tenet of the American doctrine of 
freedom of speech (and its non-selective application), together with the American mode of racial 
relations policy, creates conditions that constantly moderate harm to feelings: they dissociate the 
state from the offensive positions.  This structure, thus, enables the doctrine of free speech to 
uphold a rule by which harm to feelings, by itself, is not a valid basis for silencing speech.  This 
moderating mechanism on harm to feelings is a functional alternative to the content-based 
prohibition on hate speech which other countries, lacking such a mechanism, have been almost 
compelled to impose. 
In addition to being an important lesson for comparative law analysis, the comparison 
between the American and the Israeli doctrines regarding offensive speech raises two other 
points.  First, the American example demonstrates how “content neutrality” can indeed perpetuate 
the justification for its own use in the domain of speech.  This is because it illustrates how ‘more 
speech’ (the non-intervention of the state in terms of restrictions) may indeed be a realistic 
remedy for potential harm caused by speech.  Put differently, content neutrality weakens the 
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likelihood that legitimacy might be attributed to extremist views simply because they were 
allowed to be part of the public discourse. 
The second, prudential point is that the content neutrality principle and its comprehensive 
and consistent implementation is not easily exportable.  This is because the effects of content 
neutrality depend upon other, non-universal, sociopolitical circumstances, especially the ethnic 
relations policy of the relevant society.  Israel’s ethnic democracy (and the derived sensitivities of 
its Palestinian-Arab minority), as opposed to the liberal-integrative model of the United States, 
has illustrated this point. 
